Informal institutions play an indispensable role in supporting the economic transactions in a developing country particularly in the procurement of production resources such as labor capital or equipment
In rural China economic transactions are also supported personally by informal institutions through human governance rengzhi rather than impersonally by formal institutions through legal governance fazhi Traditional Chinese economic transactions were originally characterized by the coexistence of impersonal competition and personal reliance Muramatsu
Kyoto University This paper is based on Asami which was awarded Journal Article Prize of the Agricultural Economics Society of Japan This research was partially supported by a Grant in Aid for Scientific Research C The activities of impersonal market competition were constrained by the establishment of the People s Republic of China however the reform and opening up policy implemented since re introduced competition in the economy In the present scenario of rural China not only impersonal competition but also personal reliance based on informal institutions has been restored again in transactions These facts are confirmed in monographs Sasaki and Karasawa or quantitative studies Sato
In order to generalize the study of informal institution theoretical and empirical quantitative studies based on economics are required however previous studies have still not achieved an economic examination The importance of informal institutions in developing countries was recognized as the social embeddedness of the economy which is proved in the moral economy debate However this debate merely introduces the concept of embeddedness related to morals without indulging in detailed analysis Generalized study using economics has not succeeded thus far because there is no established economic methodology for analyzing the dyadic relationship such as between supplier and buyer However since the s a new approach to the dyadic relationship between supplier and buyer has been established in the form of the contract theory for example Ito According to Klein within the framework of contract theory self enforcement is the enforcement of a dyadic transaction between the best partners without any third party such as a legal system he indicates that informal institutions are mechanisms through which this transaction is conducted In keeping with the framework of the contract theory an economic examination of the informal institutions that support economic transactions in rural China is conducted in this paper from the perspective of a dyadic relationship
In addition since the dyadic relationship is a micro level phenomenon studies thus far have merely introduced actual cases In contrast this paper clarifies the actual situation of informal institutions in rural China by using quantitative approach The data used in this study is author s interviews conducted with the villagers of Beijing Shangdong Liaonei and Hubei Provinces and the micro data of farm households collected for the National Rural Social Economic Survey Data Collection published by China Agriculture Press guanxi The nature of informal social institutions in rural China can be understood as socially networked nepotism that is based on gift giv ing in other words gift giving guanxi ties In China economic transactions are strongly supported by informal dyadic particularistic ties such as kinship or personal relations that are known as guanxi ties In the buyer supplier relationship one party places the other party in a series of social concentric circles produced by one s own social influence with the self at the center Each social circle spreads out from the center and becomes increasingly distant and thereby insignificant Therefore the conclusion of a transaction between the buyer and supplier depends on the distance or the strength of the connection between them This concentric circles formed by all people in a social network are inter related and they touch different circles at the different times and places depending on the type of transaction Fei terms this type of social networking the differential mode of association chaxugeju Guanxi ties are a rather important aspect of economic or business relationships in China A guanxi tie is essentially characterized by the formation of relationship or association between two or more people for mutual benefit and implies entering into reciprocal obligations One of the ways in which such guanxi relationships are formed is through gift giving The importance of gift giving may be ascertained by the surprising fact that over of the expenditure of each farm household is appropriated for gift giving Yan
Gifts not only include monetary presents or invitations to banquets but also the giving of respect loyalty and compliments Guanxi ties may be divided into instrumental guanxi ties gongjuxi and expressive guanxi ties qingganxi and are characterized by the exchange of instrumental gifts and expressive gifts respectively Yan Huang and Yang
Initially it was only the instrumental guanxi ties that attracted academic attention This type of guanxi ties are established by instrumental gift giving in order to procure favors from the other person In particular under the planned economy such ties were commonly established in order to secure material resources from those in power After the social reform period instrumental guanxi ties have been frequently established in order to secure political and economical connections Yang Walder Gold Sonoda These instrumental guanxi ties are mainly observed in urban areas while expressive guanxi ties are chiefly found in the rural ar ea
The expressive guanxi ties may be described as a relationship of trust among close members in a village that is founded on the basis of maintaining moral norms and human feeling renqing in order not to lose face value mianzi Expressive guanxi ties are established by the giving of expressive gifts in the form of money or material goods that are presented on important ceremonial occasions in the family such as weddings or New Year celebrations Expressive gift giving is based on the concept of reciprocity or lishangwanglai which is a remnant of Confucianism in which a gift of the same value must be given to the presenter by the receiver Therefore a list of gifts is maintained by all villagers so that they may remember what they received and then reciprocate in equal measure Lishangwanglai is not only an ethical issue but also includes economic motivation Bilateral transactions based on a mutually equal position such as labor exchange in agriculture or construction mutual finance without interest or mutual aid of food during an emergency are embedded in this ethics Therefore expressive guanxi ties have the following attributes The circle of association based on expressive guanxi ties is fixed and there is a reciprocal exchange of expressive gifts within this circle A one sided upgrade of gifts motivated by vanity is avoided by both parties as it would unexpectedly burden the other party Thus the villager in a higher income bracket will not unilaterally give a higher priced gift to the other party in a lower income bracket Expressive gifts of equal value are exchanged regardless of income level Further instrumental guanxi ties are also formed through the interaction among people living in rural and urban areas A social concentric circle in the form of a traditional villager s association functions as the line of demarcation between village and city Expressive guanxi ties are established within this village boundary while instrumental guanxi ties are established beyond this boundary Yan Chaps and In order to procure resources that are not available in the village but are available in the city villagers attempt to establish instrumental guanxi ties with people in the city Therefore instrumental guanxi ties are established to acquire access to special materials that are allocated preferentially to the city urban employment opportunities connections to political elite who live in the city whose help is sought in emergencies or social status in the village of being acquainted with the sophisticated city people In order to establish guanxi ties with influential city people who control these resources villagers present instrumental gifts to them as a face saving activity This act of gifting is known as songli Thus gifts are given by those who are lower in the hierarchy to those who are higher This is in contrast to the practice in primitive society in which the upper classes gave gifts to the lower ones Although the act of songli is from villager to city people as a matter of courtesy the receiver must reciprocate in the form of a small gift that is lower in value than what has been received Since instrumental gifts are given by villagers to city people villagers may strengthen the guanxi tie with city people by upgrading the gift Therefore the villagers with higher incomes can increase their interaction with city people beyond the village boundary by giving a greater number of instrumental gifts As a result they may be able to obtain better employment opportunities superior material resources or secure better political connections thereby increasing their incomes Moreover such villagers can also acquire a higher status of being better acquainted with the sophisticated city people In addition to an increase in income procurement of material resources is also embedded in instrumental guanxi ties However if there is an increase in rural urbanization due to economic development then the village boundary itself vanishes and instrumental guanxi ties coexist with expressive guanxi ties in the village Lishangwanglai In this section the mechanism of gift giving guanxi ties will be explained on the basis of the framework of self enforcement of transactions Thus far gift giving is recognized as the cost for the presenter to establish relationships However this is also an indication of enhancement of the receiver s utility In particular in Chinese guanxi ties gift giving serves to honor the receiver that is increases his her face value zengjia mianzi Transaction can be characteristically enforced by this increased face value based on the gifts that are given Therefore this paper divides the gift giving players into presenter and receiver and builds a model of the relationship between the two players in which their gifts work as variables to establish the condition of self enforcement of a transaction What is self enforcement of transactions between supplier and buyer According to Aoki and Klein this concept can be easily understood within the framework of game theory It is defined as a condition in which the present value sum of the discounted future benefits from a series of repeated honest transactions must be larger than the one time gain from cheating Aoki reviews the mechanisms that are necessary to fulfill this condition We assume a game in which the supplier and buyer obtain benefit R if both play honestly and one player obtains benefit A if only he cheats R A Further even in the case of prisoner s dilemma if both players adopt the trigger strategy to indicate the option of terminating the transaction benefit as the threat point the transaction can still be enforced However with this proviso the condition A m R R must be fulfilled without execution by a third party where i is the discount rate i is the discount factor and m is a sufficiently long period of time As mechanisms for fulfilling the condition of self enforcement described above ostracism by the community Aoki and Hayami the moral code Aoki and gift giving as the cost Aoki Carmichael and MacLeod are considered Although this paper also focuses on gift giving it addresses a different aspect as that done in previous research gift giving related to the face value of the receiver Even in the condition A R that does not support self enforcement without any intervention gift giving can make the transaction enforceable In this case gift giving is held independently from the transaction Gifts could be given once prior to the transaction which is true in the case of instrumental guanxi ties On the other hand gifts could be exchanged repeatedly on a long term basis which is true in the case of expressive guanxi ties Regardless of how a gift is given the concerned parties are aware of the gift as the total amount of value g discounted to reflect the time value Suppose that the gift given by the supplier of a resource to the buyer is gs and the gift from the buyer to the supplier is gb If the trading counterpart receives the gift the receipt increases his face value and enhances his utility In other cases if a gift is given to a mediator it increases his face value then the mediator humbly requests the trading counterpart thereby resulting in an indirect increase in the face value of the counterpart Let this degree of increasing face value be denoted by the degree of face value a This degree also represents the degree of favor conceded by the gift receiver to the presenter because the increase in face value causes the receiver to concede the presenter with favors The more influential the social position of the receiver the larger his degree of face value and the degree of favor to the presenter is due to the amount of pride The more intimate the relationship between the receiver and presenter the greater is the loss of pride in the case of losing face Accordingly for a gift of the same value a closer relationship between the presenter and the receiver entails a greater increase in face value and greater intensity of the degree of face value The payoff matrix of the transaction involving gift giving is presented in Figure  The additional terms of a gb and a gs indicate the degree of favor conceded by the gift receiver First let us consider the expressive guanxi ties that are observed traditionally in Chinese village Villagers established equitable relations and the degree of face value a of both presenter and receiver is the same in the village Moreover there is a reciprocal exchange of gifts in this relationship The receipt of a gift increases face value of the receiver this makes the receiver underestimate the one time gain from cheating and consequently hold the inequality sign condition in other words the benefit received in the case that one player cheats is smaller than or equal to the benefit received in the case that both play honestly thereby supporting self enforcement in the transaction Now we consider the case of a customary labor exchange transaction in construction or agricultural work that is embedded in the expressive guanxi ties The transaction between the supplier and buyer of labor can be self enforceable through the following conditions A gb R gs a gb A gs R gb a gs respectively which can be rewritten as
Even under the condition A R that is not self enforceable self enforcement can be brought about by introducing the exchange of gifts gs and gb In the inequality equation a gb and a gs represents the concession in the cheating strategy Both the supplier and buyer decide to reduce portion a gb and a gs respectively from cheating benefit A because they concede more than the gift gb and gs due to the increase in face value which enables the transaction to be self enforceable a is the influence of an increase in face value on the concession which implies the increase in concession caused by the increase in face value through the receipt of the gift Accordingly the condition a is necessary in other words the degree of face value a must be a There exists a social judgment that a gift must be restrained to the furthest extent possible in terms expenditure because buying expensive gifts is considered a dissipation of funds or an unnecessary expense Since a gift is often given in a formalistic form such as a memento the value of the gift is reduced to below its cash value Therefore the total expenditure of both gift giving G gs gb must be as low as possible The gift must be an expressive one in the case of gift giving among villagers The following constrained minimization condition represents the most efficient guanxi tie that can be self enforced In the most efficient situation for minimizing G the labor exchange transaction can be self enforceable on the condition that the value of the gift received by the presenter is exactly the same as that of the receiver This is known as lishangwanglai which is governed by rational conduct to seek efficiency rather than adhere to ethics Further it must be noted that the larger the value of a the smaller the value of gd and gs A more intimate relationship increases the degree of face value and makes the receiver concede more to prevent cheating for a certain gift The more intimate the relationship is the more saving there is with regard to the expenditure on the gift Therefore it is shown that the intimate relationship is efficient in terms of saving on gift expenditure Songli In this section we consider instrumental guanxi ties The relationships are formed as the transactions between rural buyers and urban suppliers of resources that are available only in urban areas such as employment opportunities special material resources political connections or social status in villages Villagers establish relationships with influential city people who have access to these re- sources Hence they are not on equal footing with each other and their degree of face value is also different due to difference in the social status Suppose that the influence of an increase in face value of an urban supplier a caused by a rural buyer s gift gb is substituted byFurther the influence of an increase in face value of rural buyer a caused by the reciprocal gifting of smaller value by the urban supplier gift gs is substituted by r r Thus in the case of instrumental guanxi ties self enforcement of a transaction may be realized by introducing the exchange of gifts gs and gb on the following condition
A q gb R gs A r gs R gb
In order to minimize the total expenditure of gift giving for both the supplier and buyer G gs gb subject to the abovementioned conditions of self enforcement the following equilibrium solutions must be satisfied in terms of gb gb and gs gs gb r r q R A gsr R A Thus instrumental guanxi ties are established among people of different social status and thus people in the relationship are not on equal footing on the other hand expressive guanxi ties are established among those with the same social status and thus people are on the same equal footing that is r q Therefore the question that arises is what is the position of city people in relationship to the villagers In order to answer this question the equilibrium solutions presented above are partially differentiated by q in the following manner gb q r r q r A R gs q r q r A R This differentiation represents the effect of the influence of city people s face value q for the given influence of a villager s face value r Since the sign of both differentiations is negative both gb and gs decrease as q increases for the given r We compare the expressive case r q which contains gb and gs with the instrumental case r q which contains gb and gs If q is bigger than r both gift expenses gb and gs are smaller on the expressive case gb gb gs gs As a result the expenditure on gifts can be saved for both the buyer and supplier therefore making this relationship efficient for both parties The influence of face value of city people q is more intensive than that of villagers r is efficient for the dyad The savings yielded by this fact S gb gb gs gs may be shared between the two parties through negotiation Suppose the city peo ple s bargaining power is share ratio Ultimately the gift given is gb gb S for the villager and gs gs S for the city people and the difference between the value of the two gifts is gb gs S A Nash solution indicates that However the villager is not on an equal footing with the city people but is in a position to ask them for a favor Therefore it is expected that and the condition gb gs can be satisfied The act of gift giving by villagers to the influential city people in rural China is influenced by economically rational conducts of obtaining favors in return for giving gifts rather than culture
Guanxi
How are transactions actually embedded in the gift giving guanxi ties In order to clarify this quantitatively we utilized questionnaire methodology pertaining to the importance of guanxi ties in villages of Beijing city undeveloped BA village located km away from the city center BB village that is developing based on green tourism and urbanized BC village that is within commuting distance in a day The actual names of the villages are not used for the sake of convenience in research We asked respondents to evaluate the importance of guanxi ties on a scale from grade points with representing the strongest assent to the importance of guanxi ties First the average evaluation points ascribed to guanxi ties in each village are examined as a criteria of 
Notes
We asked for an evaluation of the past in the case that labor exchange is no longer prevalent This is the case of BC village Per capita income is taken at the nominal value of lage the total evaluation points given to gift giving guanxi ties is less than The rating given to the following performance factors that contribute toward the total evaluation are also less than except for a few factors in BC village bilateral transaction factors such as reciprocity of gifts in ceremonial occasions labor exchange mutual financing mutual help in an emergency zhanguang if a person is successful in life he must provide favor to others and share the wealth with them and increase in face value Further lishangwanglai itself is evaluated at under point Expressive guanxi ties based on gift giving is positively evaluated with regard to not only enabling the maintenance of human feelings related to face value but also in smoothening bilateral transactions
Further it is evident from the evaluation points of less than ascribed to instrumental gifts for obtaining favor such as acquiring access to valuable material resources that are available only in cities and gaining employment in cities that not only general gift giving but giving gifts of high quality are recognized as necessary in lower income villages In addition the establishment of an instrumental guanxi tie with influential city people based on gift giving is evaluated highly in all villages this is because such a relationship enables the villagers to seek assistance from city people to access to the resources and opportunities available in the city Social status in the village and establishing personal connections with influential city people are also regarded as important in lower income villages Generally speaking the evaluation is closer to in the order of BA BB BC villages BA ranked it closer to and it is conjectured that the traditional village evaluates the guanxi tie more highly than others This is because traditional customs are still prevalent in a village Second the performance factor related to guanxi ties that determines the overall evaluation is investigated In order to do this the categorical regression is run on total evaluation of each performance factor and the contribution of each factor is examined Table  Bilateral transaction of labor exchange in agriculture and construction contribute positively in all villages In particular in BB village all the performance factors of bilateral transaction contribute positively toward the overall rating Face value also contributes positively although it is not significant in BA village As is evident from these aspects expressive guanxi ties are not only established on the basis of human emotions such as face value but also include bilateral economic transactions It must be noted that mutual financing and mutual help are negative and zhanguang is positive in BA and BC villages however the signs of these factors are opposite in BB village In the former villages owing the ac- tual payment to the partner such as financing is burdensome while the possibility of zhanguang to the partner may be expected The opposite tendency was found in BB village Moreover the reciprocity of gifts is negative in the urbanized BC village which indicates that a gift is considered more burdensome in a modern life Further with regard to the contribution of performance evaluation to overall evaluation of instrumental guanxi ties with city people seeking assistance for various purposes in the city and acquiring social status contribute significantly positively although the latter factor is not significant in BA village as shown in Table  Transactions that demand assistance for various purposes in the city and social status are certainly embedded in the instrumental guanxi ties with city people However the R of BC village is extremely low which indicates that village boundaries disappear due to urbanization and interaction with city people is not considered to be conspicuous
Guanxi
We propose the following working hypotheses based on the above mentioned actual conditions and the theoretical basic models that are explained in section There exists gift giving guanxi ties in rural China There is a boundary related to human relationships in traditional villages Villagers who establish expressive ties with other villagers in the same village remain within the boundary on the other hand villagers who establish instrumental ties with city people cross the boundary Expressive guanxi ties are established regardless of income level in the traditional village whereas instrumental guanxi ties are embedded in the obtaining of urban resources and are related to income level In order to test these hypotheses we use field research data and micro data from National Rural Social Economic Survey Data Collection under the cooperation of the Research Center for Rural Economy RCRE which edits this data collection Research permission was granted for villages in provinces selected from all the fixed rural observation villages that provided the source data of the above mentioned statistics
The provinces are the less developed Hubei province HA HB and HC village the remarkably developing Shangdong province SA SB and SC village and the industrialized Liaoning province LA LB and LC village
We requested the household heads to gather in an assembly room of the village office Thereafter we interviewed them with the cooperation of RCRE staff in order to ascertain the actual situation of gift giving guanxi ties The research in Shangdong province was conducted in November that in Liaoning was conducted in March and Moreover the accounting tables of each farm household from to which is the micro data of each farm household were obtained in each village in the permitted range However we were unable to match the micro data obtained with the actually interviewed households The general situation of research villages and the number of interviewed households are presented in Table  We analyze micro data deflated by consumer price indices obtained from China statistical yearbook guanxi
Here we verify the existence of gift giving guanxi ties First from the results of the interviews we ascertain that intimate relationships are convenient for people and personal transactions characterized by guanxi ties are still conducted in numerous cases Table  Since we are unable to find large differences among villages in this regard the data are pooled in each province The respondents include not only the household head but also his family member s Overall the transactions related to the establishment of personal relationships explain of the total transactions The respondents revealed that they scarcely attempt to resolve the trouble of transactions in court but settle the dispute through the establishment of personal relationships These facts indicate the importance of personal transaction in rural China Second the micro data confirms the fact that both gift giving within the village or that given outside the village accounts for a sufficiently large portion of both total expenditure and total revenue Table The micro data on expenditure on gifts was collected only for the year so that with regard to expenditure only the micro data for households that actually spend on gifts in is used for analysis With regard to revenue from gift gift revenue we use the micro data for households that actually receive such gifts for the period from to The expenditure on gifts gift expenditure accounts for of total expenditure for every household that actually spends on gifts Further with regarding to the proportion of gift revenue to total revenue the total gift revenue and the gift revenue received from outside the village accounts for and respectively for each household that actually receives gift revenue These figures are only average thus the actual proportion is much bigger in certain households These facts confirm that gifts play a rather important role in the economic activity of each individual farm household Third we confirm that lishangwanglai is actually practiced in the form of expressive gift giving in village Table It is expected that the revenue from gifts do equalize in the long run in a household through lishang- We compare the expenditure incurred on gifts in to the average gift revenue in years for each household wanglai although there is a large difference in terms of this revenue among households in the one year base The equalization can be measured by coefficient of variation among households a smaller variation represents equalization The micro data are panelized in order to analyze the equalization of revenue in the households over different years By using this panel data the one year average of the coefficient of variation of the gift revenue received by households in each year is compared to coefficient of variation for the total gift revenue over years Although in SB village the difference is not significant the total coefficient of variation for years is less than coefficient of variation of one year average in all villages this provides evidence for lishangwanglai Fourth with regard to instrumental guanxi ties established outside the village we confirm that gifts are given from villager to city people based on songli Table According to the definition of other expenditure provided by the National Rural Social Economic Survey Data Collection other expenditure of the household comprises remittances party membership fees fines and gift expenditure The former three categories of expenditure are not found in any household therefore we obtain the gift expenditure for establishing instrumental guanxi ties with city people by deducting the proportion of gift expenditure on gift giving in the village from other expenditure We examine the case of the household that actually spends on gifts in and compare its gift expenditure for gift giving to city people with the average of the past years of the gift revenue received from the city people It is found that the gift revenue does not cover the gift expenditure in all villages thus it may be confirmed that gifts are given by villagers to city people in a single year
The four aspects discussed above quantitatively verify the existence of gift giving guanxi ties in rural China Thus hypothesis is supported guanxi Suppose that the degree of interaction with city people is considered as the ratio of gift revenue received from outside the village to the total gift revenue we investigate the trends in each total revenue bracket high semi high middle semi middle and low by using statistics of rural households nationwide from the National Rural Social Economic Survey Data Collection Figure  It is found that the degree of interaction with city people remained high only in the top bracket and the difference from other brackets was large until However the difference began to decrease after In other words due to the existence of vil- Source statistics of rural households nationwide in National Rural Social Economic Survey Data Collection lage boundaries only the villagers who earned a high total revenue and had the capacity to spend on gifts could establish instrumental guanxi ties with city people beyond the village boundary However urbanization accompanied by economic development has led to the diminishing of village boundaries and there is no difference in interaction with city people among the total revenue brackets after If we verify that there is a difference of interaction with city people among the total revenue brackets the existence of the village boundary is ascertained Suppose that receiving gift revenue from beyond the village represents the presence of interaction with city people Then if only villagers belonging to high revenue brackets interact with city people and receive gifts from beyond the village boundary and if villagers in low revenue brackets do not have such interaction and indulge in such gift giving it may be said that the village boundary exists and the total revenue is positively correlated with the fact that gift revenue is received from beyond the village However if there was no difference in interactions with city people and gifts would be received from beyond village boundaries irrespective of total revenue the same correlation cannot be found We quantitatively verify these aspects based on a probit analysis according to the following specification
Bs c aj Ajs ujs j
For the household s that actually receive the gifts we assume the binary outcome Bs in the case that the gift revenue is received from beyond the village boundary in other words there is interaction with city people In other cases we assume that Bs Moreover we also assume that A is the total household revenue RMB A is the non agricultural working days working days spent for household management working days spent for activities other than household management and migrant working days which are limited to manufacturing construction transportation and trade A is age A is the dummy variable of party cadre A if he is a party cadre Explanatory variables are the factors that influence the possibility of interaction with city people in addition to total revenue Further c aj and ujs denote the constant term parameters to be estimated and disturbance term
The estimation results are presented in Table  A significantly positive correlation with total revenue is found in a majority of the villages although the correlation is not significant in the case of HB village Moreover positive correlation cannot be found in the case of LB and LC villages where both the revenue level and the ratio of part time farmers are high and urbanization is evident In other words the village boundary exists and there is a difference of interaction with city people on the basis of total revenue in traditional villages However this difference cannot be found and the boundary is construed to be diminishing in urbanized villages such as LB and LC Thus these estimation results support hypothesis With regard to non agricultural working days it is expected that the sign is negative if a non agricultural firm exists in the village and positive if a non agricultural firm exists only beyond the village With regard to age it is expected that sign is positive if the younger villagers attach importance to interaction with city people and negative if the older villagers establish a greater number of acquaintances in the city With regard to the party cadre it is expected that the sign is positive if he she emphasizes interaction with city people and negative in the opposite case However few significant results are found and no conclusions can be obtained except for total revenue guanxi According to hypothesis income is not correlated with expressive guanxi ties but with instrumental ones We assume that gift expenditure for gift giving beyond village boundaries is a proxy variable of instrumental guanxi ties However we use gift revenue instead of expenditure because the data on gift expenditure is obtained only for the year The gift revenue received from beyond the village boundary should be proportional to the gift expenditure on gifts for city people since the gift revenue is determined by the reciprocal gifts of smaller value obtained due to songli Similarly we also assume that the gift expenditure in villages is a proxy variable of expressive guanxi ties but we use gift revenue instead of expenditure The gift revenue in villages should increase in proportion to the gift expenditure in villages since the gift revenue is determined by the reciprocal gift of lishangwanglai In other words both kinds of gift revenues function as proxy variables of guanxi ties In order to examine the correlation between the expressive or instrumental guanxi ties and income we compute the income function for each household according to the following specification Income in this case is obtained by deducting gift revenue from total income The income of a household depends on its individual characteristics such as economic ability and gift revenue of the household is also influenced by the individual situation in terms of social interaction There is a possibility that gift revenue and individual effect are correlated each other and thus we adopt the panel data analysis method We assume that the time effect does not appear in the case of farm household income that includes non agricultural income and do not consider this effect Table  HA HC SB  and LA villages The estimation results are presented in Table With the exception of HA village the positive correlation of gift revenue from beyond the village boundary with household income is significantly confirmed although the significant correlation of gift revenue in village with household income is not confirmed This result reveals the following aspects With regard to instrumental guanxi ties established with city people a villager earning a higher income can strengthen guanxi ties by giving more instrumental gifts and further increase income by obtaining resources acquiring job opportunities or human connections in the city In addition the villager may enhance his social status in the village as his income increases and interaction with sophisticated city people can be increased further On the other hand expressive guanxi ties are not related to income level Expressive gift giving could be related to the personal situation of the person such as age or the number of relatives Such ties do not enhance income level Thus hypothesis is supported obtaining resources is embedded only in instrumental guanxi ties which is related to increasing income The insignificant result in HA village can be due to the establishment of a semi urbanized social relationship in this village This is because the percentage of part time farmers is high and the coefficient of planted area is significantly negative which implies that agriculture could be burdensome in this village
In rural China transactions are conducted through embeddedness in the informal social institutions of gift giving guanxi ties since the formal institution of law does not support transactions perfectly Transactions are self enforceable based on reciprocal exchange of gifts lishangwanglai in the case of expressive guanxi ties within the village and based on gift giving from villagers to city people songli in the case of instrumental guanxi ties Gift giving is not related to income level in the expressive guanxi ties but is related to it in the instrumental guanxi ties due to the difference in the manner of gift giving These informal institutions based on lishangwanglai and songli are generally the results of rational conducts to save gift expen diture not just influenced by culture Accordingly the following relationship was found among the expressive or instrumental guanxi ties gift giving and income through quantitative analysis
The reality that transactions in rural China are embedded in gift giving guanxi ties is confirmed by categorical regression analysis of the data pertaining to guanxi ties collected through the questionnaire methodology Furthermore by using farm household micro data of Shangdong Liaoning and Hubei province we ascertained the existence of gift giving guanxi ties we provided evidence of existence of village boundaries in guanxi ties using probit analysis and we verified that income is not correlated with expressive guanxi ties but is correlated with instrumental guanxi ties with city people In other words we first prove theoretically that gift giving is a result of rational conduct that minimizes expenditure Thereafter a few hypotheses derived from the theory are proposed and empirically supported in short it is concluded that we verify the rationality of informal institutions in rural China It is sometimes believed that formal law governance is normative and informal human governance such as gift giving guanxi ties is irrational However transactions based on guanxi ties possess intrinsic rationality in which the transaction is self enforceable by the minimum expense on gifts It is implied that under a situation wherein the cost of transition from informal to formal social institutions for economic transaction is prohibitive the present informal human governance based on gift giving will continue to be employed by Chinese villagers because it is an intrinsically rational system This paper interprets an economic transaction as a procurement of resources in a broad sense It is referred to as transaction in the text There is a lot of argument regarding the importance of informal institutions in developing countries Miyazawa in anthropology Miura Kishimoto and Sekimoto in history Granovetter in sociology and Aoki and Hayami in economics are selected as the representatives of the arguments A detailed explanation of this micro data is provided by Tsujii Matsuda and Asami
There are diversified differences in the content and degree of gift giving guanxi ties between villages of the same surname and those with mixed surnames or among various areas However this diversification is abstracted for the purpose of generalizing a conclusion
The following description of gift giving guanxi ties in rural China is found in Yan Wilson Kipnis For details on rural bilateral relationship see Qi and Uchiyama Therefore it is indicated that gifts are burdensome for the low income brackets Yan Chap This word is often used in the dialect of rural areas This social judgment corresponds with the basis of taxation on entertainment expenditure in China It is also indicated by Posner that perfunctory gift giving decreases in value for both presenter and receiver Mutual finance without interest is considered as supply and demand of money Mutual assistance during the emergent time of food shortage is considered as supply and demand of food These interpretations indicate that bilateral transaction of money and food is supported by equal expressive gift exchange Since this research began in is used as the base year for deflation Moreover was also used as the base year in Asami et al based on the same research data Thus we correspond the base year to the study However is used as the base year in Tables  and  in order to facilitate better understanding These facts may be confirmed from individual micro data A detailed examination of each result has not been included due to restrictions of space
The interaction with city people is considered as the instrumental guanxi tie It is indicated by Wilson that the interaction with city people is the most important among inter-
